In this paper we present a novel type of digital signatures, which we call blank digital signatures. The basic idea behind this scheme is that an originator can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as multiple choices for exchangeable parts of a message. One may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from. Then, a proxy is given the power to sign an instantiation of the template signed by the originator by using some secret information. By an instantiation, the proxy commits to one allowed choice per blank field in the template. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator's and the proxy's signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the "unused" choices from the message template given a message signature. Consequently, the template is hidden from verifiers.
INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures provide the means to achieve source authentication and data integrity for digital messages in a publicly verifiable way meaning that at signing time a signer commits himself to a concrete message. In this paper, we propose the novel concept of a blank digital signature scheme. Here, an originator can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as several choices for exchangeable parts of a message (one may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from), for which he can delegate signing permissions to a proxy. This proxy is given the power to sign template instantiations of the template given by the originator by using some secret information. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator's and the proxy's signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the "unused" choices from the message template and, consequently, about the template when given a message signature. In order to construct such a scheme it is helpful to look at existing variants of digital signature schemes to figure out, whether they can be used to instantiate blank digital signatures.
Conventional digital signatures require the signer to be available during signature creation, e.g., when a contract is signed. To overcome this limitation, the concept of proxy signatures [16] has been introduced. Basically, a proxy signature scheme allows an entity (the delegator) to delegate his signing capabilities to another entity (the proxy) that can then construct signatures on behalf of the delegator. This concept has seen a considerable amount of interest since then [7] . Surprisingly, only quite recently a suitable security model for proxy signatures has been introduced [6] , and been extended to multi-level and identity-based proxy signature schemes later on [21] . Since in a practical application, the delegator may not want to give the proxy the power to sign any message on behalf of the signer, the delegation by warrant [16] approach was proposed. Here, a signed warrant is used to describe the delegation. Thereby, any type of security policy may be included in the warrant to describe the restrictions under which the delegation is valid. This approach seems to be particularly attractive and received the most attention, since the designator can define a message space for which he delegates his signing rights. In state of the art schemes [21, 7] , a warrant consists of the description ω of the message space for which signing is being delegated, together with a "certificate", which is a signature on ω under the delegators private signing key. We are given a similar requirement and, consequently, could ask whether proxy signatures can be used in this setting. In proxy signatures, this warrant is an abstract description, which could, for instance, be a context-free grammar, a regular expression, or as in [6] , the description of a polynomial-time Turing machine computing the characteristic function of all potential messages, i.e., given a message to decide, whether the message is covered by ω or not. However, in proxy signatures the proxy is allowed to sign arbitrary messages from this abstract message space with the downside that the verifier learns the entire message space. Consequently, our requirement that the proxy can sign instantiations of a template without a verifier learning the corresponding template can not be realized by using existing proxy signature schemes.
Conventional digital signature schemes do not allow alterations of a signed document without invalidating the signature. Since it may be valuable to have the possibility to replace or remove (specified) parts of a message after signature creation such that the original signature stays valid (and no interaction with the original signer is required), redactable [23, 13] as well as sanitizable signature schemes [3] have been introduced. Signature schemes, which allow removal of content (replacement by some special symbol ⊥) by any party are called redactable [23, 13] , while signature schemes allowing (arbitrary) replacements of admissible parts by a designated party are called sanitizable signature schemes [3] , cf.
[20] for a comparison. As in our setting, the proxy should be allowed to choose from a list of predefined replacements for designated parts of the message, one could ask whether redactable or sanitizable signatures can be used in this setting. Since in redactable signature schemes any party is allowed to modify signed messages by removing message parts, such signature schemes are obviously not compatible with our requirements. The original concept of sanitizable signatures [3] allows designated sanitizers to replace designated parts of a message. However, here the sanitizer does not have the role of a proxy meaning that it does not sign the modified message. Furthermore, a sanitizer can replace the designated parts with arbitrary strings, which is clearly not meeting our requirements. The concept of sanitizable signatures was later on extended to allow only permitted replacements [15] , yet, the Bloom filter [5] based construction does not meet cryptographic security requirements and the cryptographic accumulator [4] based approach [15, 9] allows to securely restrict replacements. Yet, both approaches are not designed and also do not support the hiding of the set of accumulated values (allowed replacements) and, thus, are not suitable for our construction.
To sum this up, our concept has more in common with proxy signatures than with sanitizable signatures. This is due to our requirements that the signature of the originator is not publicly verifiable as it is the case in sanitizable signatures and only instantiations can be publicly verified as it is the case for proxy signatures.
Contribution
Since, however, none of the existing concepts covers all our requirements, we propose the novel concept of a blank digital signature scheme. Here, an originator, i.e., the signer delegating signing permissions, can define and sign a message template, describing fixed parts of a message as well as several choices for exchangeable parts of a message. One may think of a form with blank fields, where for such fields the originator specifies all the allowed strings to choose from. Then, a proxy is given the power to sign template instantiations of the template given by the originator by using some secret information. The resulting message signature can be publicly verified under the originator's and the proxy's signature verification keys. Thereby, no verifying party except the originator and the proxy learn anything about the "unused" choices from the message template and, consequently, about the template given a message signature. Since this setting is quite different from the security requirements of proxy signatures and sanitizable signatures, most importantly, the template should be hidden from verifiers, we define a novel type of signature scheme along with a suitable security model. Similar to proxy signatures and sanitizable signatures, we require a public key infrastructure meaning that the originator and proxy are in possession of authentic signing keys. Moreover, since we use polynomial commitments in our construction, we need the parameters to be generated by a trusted third party.
A naive approach to realize blank digital signatures is that the originator produces n signatures for all n possible instantiations together with the public key of the proxy using a standard digital signature scheme, whereas the proxy simply signs the originator's signature for the chosen instantiations. However, the number of signatures issued by the originator would then be O(n), which gets impractical very soon with increasing number of choices in exchangeable parts. By using randomized Merkle hash trees [17] as in redactable signatures, the number of signatures of the originator could be reduced to O(1), whereas the signature of the proxy would then, however, be of size O(log n). At first glance, this may seem attractive, yet in Section 5.4 we illustrate that this approach also becomes soon impractical with an increasing number of choices. In our construction, the number of signatures of the originator is O(1), whereas the size of both signatures, of the originator and the proxy, are also O(1) and, in particular, very small and constant. Clearly, this is far more appealing than the aforementioned naive approaches.
Outline
In Section 2, we sketch some application scenarios for blank digital signatures. Section 3 discusses the mathematical and cryptographic preliminaries. Then, in Section 4 we introduce the notion of blank digital signatures and the corresponding security model. A construction of a blank digital signature scheme along with its security proof, an efficiency analysis and a comparison to the naive approaches are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and lists open issues for future work.
APPLICATIONS
Here, we sketch some application scenarios which we envision for this novel type of digital signatures.
Partially blank signed contracts: Suppose a person is willing to sign a contract under certain predefined conditions, e.g., set of potential prices, range of possible contract dates, but is not able to sign the contract in person. Then, this person can elegantly delegate this task to another semi-trusted party, e.g., his attorney, by using blank digital signatures. The third party is then able to conclude the contract on behalf of his client. The client can do so by defining a contract template thereby leaving certain positions "blank", i.e., defining certain potential choices for the position without committing to one, and signing the template. Then, at a later point in time, the attorney is able to "fill in the gaps" by choosing from predefined choices, whereas the original signature of the client remains valid, and then signing the resulting contract as a proxy.
"Sanitizable" signatures: We may interpret exchangeable parts of message templates as replacements (with a potentially empty string) and, thus, can achieve a scheme with similar capabilities, but different meaning and strength as a non-interactive publicly accountable sanitizable signature scheme [8] 1 , which supports controlled replacements [9, 15] . Note that such a sanitizable signature scheme does not yet exist. However, there are some key differences. In contrast to sanitizable signatures, our template signature is not intended to be publicly verifiable, i.e., can only be verified by the proxy and, thus, the originator does not commit to a concrete instantiation of the template. Furthermore, in blank digital signatures, the allowed replacements are hidden, which is not supported by sanitizable signatures allowing such replacements [9, 15] . Consequently, blank digital signatures may be seen as signature schemes supporting sanitizing capabilities, but are a different concept as it is clear from the differences mentioned above.
PRELIMINARIES
In this section we firstly provide an overview of required mathematical and cryptographic preliminaries.
Mathematical Background
An elliptic curve over the finite field Fq is a plane, smooth curve described by the Weierstrass equation:
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ Fq. The set E(Fq) of points (x, y) ∈ F 2 q satisfying Equation (1) plus the point at infinity ∞, which is the neutral element, forms an additive Abelian group, whereas the group law is determined by the chordand-tangent method [22] .
Let G be a cyclic group and p be a divisor of its group order, then there exists a subgroup of order p, which we subsequently denote by G [p] . Bilinearity: For all P1, P2 ∈ G1 and P 1 , P 2 ∈ G2 we have:
Definition 1 (Bilinear Map
• e(P1 + P2, P ) = e(P1, P ) · e(P2, P ) for all P ∈ G2,
• e(P, P 1 + P 2 ) = e(P, P 1 ) · e(P, P 2 ) for all P ∈ G1.
Non-degeneracy:
If P is a generator of G1 and P a generator of G2, then e(P, P ) is a generator of GT , i.e., e(P, P ) = 1G T .
Efficiently computable: e can be computed efficiently. 
Digital Signatures
Here, we briefly recall the definition of a standard digital signature scheme. Furthermore, we require the digital signature scheme to be correct, i.e., for all (sk
Definition 2 (Digital Signature Scheme
A digital signature scheme is secure, if it is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks (UF-CMA) [12] . Note that in practice, the sign and verify algorithms will typically use a hash function to map input messages to constant size strings, which is also known as the hash-then-sign paradigm.
Polynomial Commitments
In [14] , Kate et al. introduced the notion of constantsize polynomial commitments. The authors present two distinct commitment schemes, whereas one is unconditionally binding and computationally hiding (PolyCommit DL ) and the other is unconditionally hiding as well as computationally binding (PolyCommit Ped ). For our scheme, we are using PolyCommit Ped , which is based on Pedersen commitments [19] . The constructions of [14] use an algebraic property of polynomials f (X) ∈ Zp[X]. Namely, that (X − λ) perfectly divides the polynomial f (X) − f (λ) for λ ∈ Zp: Now, we briefly present the PolyCommit Ped construction of [14] .
Setup(κ, t) : Pick two groups G, GT of the same prime order p (with p being a prime of bitlength κ) having a symmetric pairing e : G × G → GT . Choose two generators P, Q ∈ G and α ∈R Z * p and output pk = (G, GT , p, e, P, αP, . . . , α t P, Q, αQ, . . . , α t Q) as well as sk = α.
VerifyPoly(pk, C, f(X), r(X)) : Verify whether
holds and output true on success and false otherwise.
This is done by checking whether
holds. Output true on success and false otherwise.
This scheme can be proven secure under the t-SDH assumption in G, as long as t < √ 2 κ . For the proof we refer the reader to [14] . Notice that α must remain unknown to the committer (and thus the setup has to be run by a trusted third party), since, otherwise, it would be a trapdoor commitment scheme.
Moreover, we note that we do not need the algorithms CreateWit and VerifyEval in our construction, since we do not need to prove valid evaluations of the polynomial f (X) without revealing the polynomial itself. For the same reason, we simply use a random point R instead of
, which obviously also yields an unconditionally hiding Pedersen commitment.
BLANK DIGITAL SIGNATURES
In this section we introduce the notion of blank digital signatures as well as the according security model. As a prerequisite we first need to introduce representations and encodings for message templates and template instantiations.
Template and Message Representation
In the following we introduce a representation for message templates. A message template T describes all potential template instantiations that correspond to a single template. More formally, a message template is defined as follows. 
Definition 3 (Message Template). A message template T is a sequence of non-empty sets

A message template T is called
• trivial if it does not contain any exchangeable elements. Note that this implies |T | = n, and
• minimal if no two fixed elements are adjacent.
The minimal property guarantees that the number of fixed elements is kept minimal. The complement of the template instantiation M denoted as M is a sequence of sets of bitstrings and represents all unused choices in the exchangeable elements, that is M = (Ti \ {Mi})
. Now, we give a short example to illustrate our concept. In the following, we define encodings of templates and template instantiations, for which we use polynomials in the Euclidean ring Zp[X]. This allows us to perform polynomial division with remainder, which is essential to our construction. 
Definition 5 (Template Encoding
). Let T =(Ti) n i=1 beT → n i=1 M ∈T i X − H(M idT i) .
The evaluation t(T ) results in a so-called template encoding polynomial tT ∈ Zp[X] of degree |T |.
Note that the degree of the resulting polynomial needs to be bounded by √ 2 κ , as otherwise the security of the polynomial commitment scheme is no longer guaranteed. However, this has no impact in practice, since the polynomial can only be created by a polynomial time algorithm. 
Definition 6 (Message Encoding
In the following, we consider all polynomials to be expanded. To do so, we assume that an algorithm Exp, which carries out the polynomial expansion, is applied implicitly to all polynomials.
Typically, a template instantiation M = (Mi)
T will be mapped to a single bitstring M = M1 . . . Mn. We denote the mapping leading from M to M by λ(M, I) = M, where I = (|Mi|) n i=1 is a descriptional sequence holding the lengths of the n elements of M as given by template T . For sake of simplicity, we consider all templates to be nontrivial as well as minimal and do not differentiate between a template instantiation M and its corresponding bitstring M .
Blank Digital Signature Scheme
Now, we are able to formally define what we mean by a blank digital signature scheme. 
Security Definitions
In the following, we define the security properties a blank digital signature scheme needs to satisfy in order to be secure. Therefore, we start with a brief overview of the required properties.
Correctness: The scheme must be correct in terms of signature correctness, signature soundness and instantiation correctness, i.e., both template and message signatures are accepted when valid and template signatures of the originator are binding.
Unforgeability:
No entity without knowledge of the private key skorig and the signing keys sk DSS orig and sk
DSS proxy
should be able to forge a valid template or message signature. This is analogous to the security of traditional digital signatures. In particular, this means that it is infeasible to produce forgeries of the following types:
T1 finding a template T * yielding the same template signature σT * = σT i for one queried template Ti.
T2 forging a valid template signature σT * for some unqueried template T * .
M1 finding another message M * = Mi j yielding message signature σM * such that σM * = σM i j for some previously queried message Mi j .
M2 forging a valid message signature σM for some non-queried M from template signature σT i for some previously queried template Ti. There are two cases:
• M Ti for some queried template Ti, • M Ti for some queried template Ti.
Immutability:
The proxy having access to sk T proxy and sk DSS proxy , when given a template signature σT for template T should not be able to forge signatures. Here, cases T1, T2 and M2 from above apply.
Privacy:
No entity should be able to restore template T from a message signature σM representing a signature for an instantiation M of template T .
Correctness
For a blank digital signature scheme the usual correctness properties are required to hold, i.e., genuinely signed templates and message signatures are accepted. Furthermore, we require template signatures to be sound, i.e., the originator commits to exactly one template by creating a template signature. 
Unforgeability
Unforgeability in the context of blank digital signatures resembles the notion of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message attacks (UF-CMA) in classic digital signature schemes. We adapt the classical notion to our setting in Game 1. Unforgeability is a protection against attacks mounted by parties not having access to any secret information.
Definition 8 (Unforgeability). A BDSS is called unforgeable, if for any polynomial-time algorithm A the probability of winning Game 1 is negligible as a function of security parameter κ.
Immutability
Immutability guarantees that no malicious proxy can compute message templates or template instantiations not intended by the signer. In contrast to unforgeability, immutability deals with malicious insiders.
The immutability game differs only slightly from the unforgeability game. Therefore, we only briefly discuss the differences. Here, the adversary additionally obtains sk 
Privacy
Privacy captures that any verifier except for the originator and the proxy, which is given a signature for a template instantiation M of a non-trivial template T , can not gain any information about M and thereby learn about T . This means that even if all but one choice of a single exchangeable element has been revealed no verifier should be able to gain complete knowledge of T . More precisely, let k be the depth of template T , which is the smallest number of instantiations necessary to reveal all choices of T , then no verifier should be able to derive information about the remaining unseen choices inside T by knowing k − 1 instantiations.
Definition 10 (Privacy). A BDSS is called private, if for any polynomial-time algorithm A the probability of winning Game 2 is negligible as a function of security parameter κ.
Security
Now, we can define what constitutes a secure blank digital signature scheme.
Definition 11. We call a BDSS secure, if it is correct, unforgeable, immutable and private.
CONSTRUCTION
In this section we detail our construction and present an analysis of its efficiency in terms of computational effort as well as key and signature sizes. Moreover, we prove its security, i.e., we show that our presented construction is correct, unforgeable, immutable and private.
KeyGen: On input (κ, t), choose an elliptic curve E(Fq) with a subgroup of large prime order p generated by P ∈ E(Fq) [p] 
It picks a point R1 ∈R E(Fq) [p] , computes R2 = R − R1, and returns the template signature σT = (idT , C, R0, R2, n, τ ) as well as sk
VerifyT : Given T , σT , pkorig, pk DSS orig , sk T proxy and pk DSS proxy , where T is a template of size |T | = and length n with > n, this algorithm checks whether |T | ≤ t. If not, it returns false. Otherwise, it computes tT = t(T ) and checks whether
T is the i'th coefficient of tT . If so, return true and false otherwise. 
where m
, σT ), pkorig, pk DSS proxy and pk DSS orig this algorithm verifies whether
M be the i'th coefficient of mM, and compute
and check whether
On success return true and false otherwise.
Scheme 1: Blank Digital Signature Scheme
Intuition
Before we present the detailed construction, we provide some intuition in order to make our design choices comprehensible. As already noted, we use standard digital signatures, such as ECDSA [11] , as a building block assuming the respective signature keys to be available to every participant in an authentic fashion. Note that this requires the availability of public key infrastructures, which are, however, commonly used in practice today. In our construction, DSS signatures provide authenticity of template and message signatures.
As already discussed in Section 4, we use polynomials to represent templates and template instantiations. The intuition is that the originator commits to a template polynomial. By construction every allowed template instantiation is represented by a message encoding polynomial that perfectly divides the template polynomial. A proxy can now commit to a message polynomial, by computing and signing a commitment to the complementary message encoding polynomial. However, he can not choose arbitrary divisors of the template polynomial, as the indexes of message elements are incorporated into the encoding and the length of the message, i.e., the degree of the message polynomial, is fixed by the originator.
In the verification, the verifier computes a commitment to the message polynomial and checks whether the computed commitment and the commitment given by the proxy re-We assume that the originator as well as the proxy both own an authentic key pair for a secure digital signature scheme (sk Setup T : The trusted third party T chooses a suitable security parameter κ and a value t ∈ N representing the maximum template length, runs KeyGen(κ, t), sends skorig to the originator O and publishes pkorig in an authentic fashion. Game 2: Privacy Game late to the commitment given by the originator, whereas the originator's commitment is given as hash value in order to prevent arithmetics. We need a trusted third party, as the originator should not know the value α. Otherwise, he could exchange the template polynomial after signature generation for another polynomial having the same evaluation at the point α. Note that in the context of polynomial commitments the setup must always be run by a trusted third party, as otherwise these commitments represent trapdoor commitments, i.e., the knowledge of α allows to open the commitment to arbitrary polynomials. We use polynomial Pedersen commitments of the form C = f (α)P + R to hide the committed polynomials. Pedersen commitments provide computational binding as long as the discrete logarithm between the values R and P is unknown. Typically, this is achieved by letting a third party compute these parameters. In our scenario, R is chosen by the originator, which requires us to additionally commit to a multiple of R and to use an additive decomposition of R in order to fix it.
Scheme
In Scheme 1, we present the detailed construction of our proposed BDSS. Moreover, in Protocol 1, we illustrate a typical scenario for the interaction of the originator, the proxy and the verifier.
We note that Scheme 1 can easily be turned into a scheme using asymmetric pairings giving flexibility in the choice of curves and pairings as well as improved efficiency. In case of Type-2 pairings there are only minor modifications necessary, as there is an efficiently computable isomorphism between G1 and G2, whereas in the Type-3 setting this comes at the costs of doubling the size of pkorig. This is because the values αP, . . . , α t P, δP, αδP, . . . , α t δP ∈ G1 also need to be mapped to elements of group G2, i.e., we need to put the additional points αP , . . . , α t P , δP , αδP , . . . , α t δP ∈ G2 into pkorig, where P is a generator of G2.
Efficiency
In the following, we give a detailed analysis of the efficiency of our scheme in terms of computational effort as well as key and signature sizes. We use P, S, A and m to denote the costs of a pairing evaluation, the costs of an elliptic curve scalar multiplication, the costs of a point addition and the costs of one multiplication in Zp, respectively. Moreover, we use Exp(d), s and v for the costs of the expansion of a polynomial of degree d, the costs of a signing operation and the costs of a signature verification, respectively. Note that Exp(d) is d(d + 1)/2m when ignoring shifts and field additions, which are inexpensive. The costs of the algorithms of Scheme 1 are summarized in Table 1 . Figure 1 illustrates the performance of the algorithms in Scheme 1 for varying template size |T | = and template length n set to /4, meaning that on average there are three choices per exchangeable element. We conducted the experiments on an Intel Core i5-2540M equipped with 8GB RAM running Ubuntu 12.10/amd64 and OpenJDK 6/amd64. For ECDSA and basic elliptic curve arithmetics we were using the Java purposes of research, as well as the jPBC library [2] version 1.2.1 for the pairing evaluations. Thereby, we are using the NIST P-224 curve [11] for ECDSA and the Tate pairing on an MNT curve [18] with a group size of 224 bits and embedding degree k = 6 in order to perform our benchmarks, respectively. Note that we have chosen the asymmetric version of Scheme 1 to gain improved efficiency. In Table 2 , we analyze the sizes of keys and signatures of Scheme 1. We use a pairing-friendly curve of bitsize κ, assume all points to be compressed and for the DSS we use ECDSA with key sizes of κ bits. Consequently, the public and private keys of the DSS are of size κ bits and the signature is of size 2κ. Note that we only count values that are related to the security parameter κ and, consequently, no small values, such as integers and the like. Observe that only pkorig depends on the maximum degree of the template polynomial tT . For instance, given a template T with 20 fixed elements and 25 exchangeable elements with 5 choices each, we obtain a template of size = 145 yielding a template polynomial tT with deg(tT ) = 145. Consequently, we have t ≥ 145 and the size of pkorig would be approximately 8.1kB for κ = 224, which is absolutely reasonable.
Algorithm Costs
KeyGen (2t+1)S Sign P+( +1)S+( +2)A+Exp( )+s VerifyT 3P+( +1)S+( +2)A+Exp( )+v Inst 3P+( −n+2)S+( −n+1)A+Exp( −n)+s+v VerifyM 3P+(2n+4)S+(2n+2)A+Exp(n)+2v
Component Size
skorig κ pkorig 2(t + 1)κ skproxy κ σT 6κ σM 10κ
Comparison to the Naive Approaches
Recall that the first naive approach given in Section 1.1 would require the originator to produce one signature for every possible template instantiation. Let us look at the above example, where we have 20 fixed elements and 25 exchangeable elements with 5 choices each. Note that this is an absolutely reasonable example, which is far from being overstated. Then, the originator would have to compute 5 25 ≈ 298 · 10 15 signatures, which is obviously impractical. The second naive approach we have mentioned is the use of Merkle hash trees to reduce the number of signatures that need to be computed by the originator at the expense of higher computational costs and an increased size of the signature. This means that the originator needs to build a complete binary tree, where the number of leaves equals the number of possible template instantiations. Furthermore, each leaf would need to include a random string as additional input to the hash function in order to hide the instantiations from a verifier as it is done in redactable signatures [13] . In our above example, the number of leaves would then be 5
25 ≈ 298 · 10 15 . In order to build the hash tree, the originator would need to perform one hash evaluation per node in the tree. Note that for a complete binary tree with n leaves there would be at most 2n − 1 nodes in the tree. For our above example, this would yield at most 2 · 5 25 − 1 hash evaluations and the same number of PRF evaluations to randomize the tree (see [13] for more details on how to compute the random strings using a PRF). Although the verification of a signature for an instantiation in this construction would be quite efficient, as it can be carried in logarithmic time in the number of possible instantiations, the Sign, VerifyT and Inst algorithms all require the computation of the full hash tree rendering this approach impractical.
We emphasize that in our approach the signature size stays constant, regardless of the number of possible template instantiations. This is due to the fact that the template polynomial, whose degree grows only linearly in the template size, is mapped to a point on the curve, which is further mapped to a field element and then hashed. Notice that in our construction, the computational effort is independent of the number of potential template instantiation. Instead, it grows only linearly with the template size, i.e., with the number and the cardinality of exchangeable elements and the number of fixed elements.
Security
Subsequently, we investigate the security of our construction in the proposed security model by considering all the required security properties. Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Taking Theorem 1-Theorem 4 together, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Scheme 1 is a secure BDSS.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have introduced a new notion of digital signatures, namely so-called blank digital signatures. We have provided the abstract scheme, a security model and a concrete construction of such a scheme from any secure digital signature scheme, pairing-friendly elliptic curves and polynomial commitments. Moreover, we have proven the security of our construction, have analyzed its efficiency supporting its practicality and have given several use cases, such as delegated contract signing.
Future Work
Since blank digital signatures are a novel concept, there are several open issues for future work, which we outline subsequently. One issue for future work is to get rid of the trusted third party for key generation. Furthermore, it would be desirable to generalize the blank digital signature scheme and its security model to multiple designated proxies, which seems to be straight-forward by inclusion of multiple proxy signature verification keys into the template signature. However, in this naive construction every proxy and every verifier can determine the set of designated proxies. This may not be desirable in practice, whereas to achieve this goal does not seem to be that straight-forward. Another issue is to find alternative designated constructions for blank signatures potentially without relying on standard digital signature schemes. Additionally, it would be desirable to prove the security of our construction under weaker assumptions and to impose further restrictions on allowed template instantiations, i.e., to further limit the allowed combinations of choices over all exchangeable elements of templates. Also, allowing blank fields, which can be substituted with arbitrary strings, would be desirable. Finally, it may be interesting to investigate concepts applied in the construction of blank digital signatures in the proxy signature setting.
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